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DRAFT PRINCIPLES OF SCHOLARLY 
ETHICS 
DEFINING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP1 
For purposes of this document, legal scholarship is defined as all published 
works that (a) are written by law faculty or other legal academics, (b) contain 
independent, critical, and careful analysis, (c) are the product of significant 
effort and professional expertise on the part of the author, and (d) provide 
information, insight, or other value to the reader.  Legal scholarship includes 
works that employ traditional legal methods, as well as works that use 
methodologies from other disciplines.  Legal scholarship is ordinarily published 
by academic presses, scholarly journals (such as law reviews), and their online 
counterparts. 
Legal scholarship does not include work which is prepared during the 
course of litigation or in other situations in which the author represents a client.  
Therefore, it necessarily excludes briefs, opinion letters, and expert testimony 
at trial. 
In defining scholarship for the purposes of this document, we do not seek 
to weigh in on whether various activities ought to “count” as scholarship for 
promotion and tenure decisions within law schools.  Different schools have 
chosen to adopt more expansive definitions for those purposes, while others 
have adopted more restrictive definitions.  Our definition of scholarship is not 
intended to endorse either a more expansive or a more restrictive view.  Instead 
it is meant only to identify the forms of scholarship to which we believe that 
the articulated principles of scholarly ethics ought to apply. 
 
1. We are hardly the first to attempt to define “legal scholarship.”  Some have defined scholarship 
as “an activity within the academy, funded by the academy, and done for the general educational benefit 
of all.”  Ronald K. L. Collins, A Letter on Scholarly Ethics, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139, 140 (1995).  Others 
have suggested that our scholarship activities include “any published work, oral or written presentation 
to conferences, drafting committees, legislatures, law reform bodies and the like, and any expert 
testimony submitted in legal proceedings.” AALS, STATEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICES BY LAW 
PROFESSORS IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (amended 
2017) (1989), https://www.aals.org/members/other-member-services/aals-statements/ethics 
[https://perma.cc/586T-96T8]. 
DEFINING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP DRAFT PRINCIPLES 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:06 AM 
898 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:897 
SPECIFIC NORMS 
Exhaustiveness: An author should treat the identified topic of a work in an 
exhaustive manner, including through the acknowledgement of and 
engagement with pertinent past work bearing on that topic. 
An author should competently and in good faith undertake sufficient 
research to identify pertinent past work addressing her topic, and should then 
acknowledge and engage with that work as appropriate.  An author should 
scrupulously avoid inaccurate claims of originality. 
An author should fully explore available legal resources and evidence, 
including that which is contrary to the author’s normative positions or goals, 
whether in general or with respect to the specific topic under investigation.  If 
non-legal sources are relevant to the project, then the author should also fully 
explore such sources.  This norm is similar to what Richard Fallon called the 
obligation of “confrontation.”  “The confrontation norm requires scholars to be 
candid in acknowledging difficulties with their arguments by confronting the 
most significant possible non-obvious objections to their analyses.”2 
More generally, in addition to her ongoing general responsibility to engage 
in research and work to improve her scholarly competence, an author has a duty 
to acquire sufficient expertise to support the production of a work and the 
claims and analyses within it.  She must, in addition, remain mindful of the 
limits of her expertise, and shape and present the claims and analysis made in a 
manner that does not exceed the bounds of that expertise.   
Sincerity/Good Faith: An author should make all of her claims, arguments, 
and characterizations of past work in good faith, and should state them in 
such a way as not to mislead her readers. 
This principle is similar to what Richard Fallon called the “norm of 
trustworthiness, which demands that [an author] sincerely believe all of her 
claims or arguments and that she state them in ways not intended to mislead her 
readers about their relations to other arguments or evidence.”  An author should, 
among other things, refrain from making false or unsubstantiated claims of 
novelty or originality.3 
It further incorporates a norm of engagement.  A scholar should not merely 
engage with the past work on a topic, but should do so in an appropriately 
charitable and respectful manner.  In circumstances where it is possible to do 
 
2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 223, 242 (2012). 
3. Ryan Scoville, The Ethics of Baiting and Switching in Law Review Submissions, 101 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1075 (2018).  
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so, an author should provide the authors of past work with which she engages 
in a substantial way the opportunity to review and respond to her 
characterization of that work. 
Candor: An author should be explicit about her methodology and the 
substantive assumptions underlying a scholarly work, and should clearly 
articulate the scope and limits of her claims, analysis, and any normative 
recommendations. 
Few works of scholarship directly address first principles, such that 
authors’ analyses necessarily proceed from certain premises and assumptions.  
Those analyses are likewise a product of and are undertaken pursuant to 
methodological choices.  Authors should clearly outline both. 
As a corollary to this principle, authors should cite to sources supporting 
any factual claims they make.  Claims about the state of the law or particular 
doctrines are factual claims that should be supported by a systemic review, and 
the methodology for that review should be disclosed.4 
In the case of any data they produce or generate themselves, authors should 
make the data publicly available to the extent possible, and they should describe 
the processes used to generate the data. 
Openmindedness: An author should approach the researching and production 
of a work with an open mind, rather than with a predetermined goal.  Put 
differently, an author should cultivate a mindset pursuant to which she 
regards herself as striving in a work of scholarship honestly to answer a 
question rather than simply to justify a pre-identified conclusion or advance a 
particular interest. 
Authors should strive to be mindful of their own biases and predilections 
and of the effects they may have on their analyses, should be open to the 
possibility that their initial hypotheses may be wrong, and should seek to adhere 
to their selected methodology and follow its analysis wherever it may lead. 
The norm of openmindedness is not a condemnation of, or even inconsistent 
with, the production of normative scholarship.  Nor does it require that authors 
disclaim a point of view.  Such a stance is impossible to achieve, and the nature 
of law and legal analysis is such that normative considerations are necessary 
ingredients.   
 
4. William Baude et al., Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic 
Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 38 (2017). 
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Disclosure: An author should disclose all information not otherwise apparent 
from the work itself that is material to the evaluation of a work of scholarship.  
This disclosure should be included in the work itself. 
The animating principle here is that a reader of legal scholarship should be 
able to identify and account for any information about the author or the 
circumstances under which a work was produced that might lead a reader to 
question the author’s ability to comply with these principles.  This obligation 
extends to any funding which might lead a reader to question whether the author 
has complied with the author’s ethical obligations as a scholar.5  It further 
extends to any affiliations or activities, professional or otherwise, with the 
potential to influence the positions taken or arguments made, including not only 
partisan affiliations but also, for example, the fact that a person has filed an 
amicus brief on an issue under analysis. 
An author should disclose the contributions of any co-authors, as well as of 
research assistants to the extent that they are responsible for any portions of the 
intellectual content or drafting of a work of scholarship. 
Disclosure does not in any way diminish an author’s obligation to comply 
with the author’s other ethical obligations as a scholar.  At times a conflict of 
interest will be so substantial that such compliance will not be possible and the 
work should not be produced.  One example of such a conflict is if a research 
funder places restrictions on the conclusions that an author may reach.  Another 
example is if an author’s professional obligations as counsel for a party or 
 
5. AALS Statement of Good Practices:  
A law professor shall disclose the material facts relating to receipt of direct 
or indirect payment for, or any personal economic interest in, any covered activity 
that the professor undertakes in a professorial capacity.  A professor is deemed to 
possess an economic interest if the professor or an immediate family member 
may receive a financial benefit from participation in the covered 
activity. . . .  Disclosure of material facts should include: (1) the conditions 
imposed or expected by the funding source on views expressed in any future 
covered activity; and (2) the identity of any funding source, except where the 
professor has provided legal representation to a client in a matter external to legal 
scholarship under circumstances that require the identity to remain privileged 
under applicable law. . . . 
A law professor shall also disclose the fact that views or analysis expressed 
in any covered activity were espoused or developed in the course of either paid 
or unpaid representation of or consultation with a client when a reasonable person 
would be likely to see that fact as having influenced the position taken by the 
professor. 
AALS, supra note 1.  
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amicus in litigation limit the ability of the author to acknowledge and explore 
counterarguments. 
Authors who have no disclosure obligations under this principle are 
encouraged to explicitly say so. 
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